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-A special grand jury in~he NO Illinois , in the c ourse of investigat-
ing illegal gamblin~subpoenaed about twenty persons , including resps : ~ 
2
~ and sought to obtain from them voice exemp_lars\for identification pur-
,/ f poses . Each witness was informed that he was a potential defendant 
~ in a matter being investigated by the grand jury . Each was asked to 
~ examine a transcript of a recording of an authorized intercepted comm-an6 to go to a nearby room and read the transcript into a 
connected to a recording device . Resps . refused to comply , 
with this ~xE~proceding , asserting rights under the Fourth and Fifth 
~ Amendments , 
The USOC NO Ill . ordered resps . to furnish the exemplars . The CA7 
~ 
reversed , holding that though no Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges 
~
were involved , tha~c.ompeling comliance would infringe on resps. Fourth 
Amendment rights . "We believe the proposition to be clearly established 
-fl,e 
that underAFourth Amendment}law enforcement officials may not compel 
the production of physical evidence absent a showing of the reasonable-
ness of the seizure. ••• It is evident t~wthat the grand jury is seeking 
to EEobtain the voice exemplars of the witnesses by the use of its sub-
poena powers because probable cause did• not exist for their arrest or i - --for some other, :il:eesless unusual method of compelling the exemplars . ~~ 
In its decision the CA? relied heavily on two of this Court ' s 
decisions . In Hale v . Henkel, 201 u.s . 43(1906) the Court struck down - -bh>O.;) a grand jury ordeqfor the production of documents under a subpoena A---
duces tecum• as an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment . In holding the subpoena overbroad, the Court said that "a 
su..b,oe..?J-=-
general seeFon ~MFFe~t of this description is equally indefensible as 
a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms." 
I 
The second case on which the CA7 relied heavily was Davis 
~-
v . Mississippi, 394 U.S . 721(1969) where the police detained and finger-.. > ::-
printed a large number of Negro youths in their investigation of an a:il::il:e 
alleged rape where the assailant was described only as a Negro youth. 
The Court in holding the procedure invalid , said that the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to prevent such "wholesale intrusions upon the personal 
security of our citizenry . " The CA7 thus interpolated that the fourth 
....... -- -
Amendme~o prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of 
the citizenry whether the intrusions resulted from illegal arrests a. GL5 
in Davis or from wholesale grana-Ju ry subpoenas as in the instan~ case . 
Court 
The SG disagrees sharp! with the CA7 holding and reques~ this 
~~~~-----------===-----===~=a-----­to gran~. The SG attacks the CA? holding as "in sharp conflict 
with the essential function of the grand jury and will seriously inter-
fere with the broad investisatory powers heretofore exercised by it •••• 
p ? 
It is the essence of the grand jury proceeding to question and obtain evid-
ence from a witness in circumstances that would not permit detaining him~ 
'' 
under any probable cause st~N~standard. In this respect the grand jury•s 
powers exceed those of most investigatory bodies , including the polic~ •••• ..__ 
'• 
I 
The CA? holding would force the government to litigate the 
~e~Mi~emquestion of reasonableness before enforcement of a grand 
jury subpoena seeking this type of eviden~. Such litigious 
interruptions of the grand jury process have long been discouraged 
b¥ this Court." The ~SG further minimizes the precedential value 
of the Davis and Henkel cases relied on by the CA?» saying that 
Davis involved police arrests , not grand jury subpoenas and that 
~ ~ . 
Henkel involved a serious incursion into privacy by me~axmeans 
of a subpoena duces tecum whereas the instant case involves 
fi~~exvoice exemplars which do not represent serious interference 
with a either a sMs~egt*switness's convenience or his private t~EM~ 
thoughts . 
The broad use of the subpoena power in this case comes 
f l l r 
perilously close to being the kind of fishing expediuon that 
this Court condemned in both Davis and Henkel . I thin~ the SGs 
brief unduly minimizesm the precedential effec~s of those 
decisions . However , a balancing of the need for broad ~xaE~ 
grand jury powers in law enforcement against the inconvenience 
and invasion of privacy of resps! in this case would lead m~me to 
~want to GRANT and quite possibly reverse the holding o~CA?. 
I feel the question has importamt enough implications in the 
field of law enforcement ~to merit a 
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No. 71-229 OT 1971 
United States v. Dionisio 
Cert to CA7(Swygert, Fairfield, Kerner). -Per Curiam. 
This case involves the important issue of whether the 
goJJernment 
~~a~EX~M~~ must make a showing of reasonableness before it 
obtains voice and handwriting exemplars from witnesses¥ ip 
;:::::>< 
a grand jury proceeding. I think you should read both this cert 
note over as well as the~~ one I a have written in No.71-850. 
I remain firmly convinced that this is a case that ought to 
merit a 
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Memorandum to the file 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: 71-229 United States v. Dionisio 
October 10, 1972 
Judge Friendly has an opinion in case 71-6522 (see my 
cert note) that is relevant to Dionisio and I should read this. 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
LFP, Jr.:pls 
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.:§u.prtmt <!Jttttrlttf t~t ~ttitt~ ~bdt.tl 
~~g!p:nghttt, ltl. <!J. 2!l~JI.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
December 28, 1972 
Re: No. 71-229 - United States v. Dionisio 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely/ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
. ' 
;§u:pTtutt ~cud cf tltt 'Jllnittb' j)tattg 
'J.'agJrittghm. ~. ~· 2llbfJl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE: CHIEF JUSTICE 
December 30, 1972 
Re: No. 71-22 9 - U. S. v. Dionisio 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
I would be much more comfortable -- and I 
submit we would be more accurate -- to alter the top 
line on page 16 by substituting for "be wholly rea listie" 
the follow :ing, "perform the same protective function 
as originally. contemplated". 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
§nprtm~ Q_\tntt t1f tl!t'~tnitdt §taus 
wa~•lringtcn, p. <e. 20,5)~,3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
January 4, 1973 
Re: No. 71-229- United States v. Dionisio 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
;,-z 
\ I ' V,..... 
' 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u:prtmt <qtmrt ctf tqt 'Jlltti.Ub- ~taftg 
~ltill~tcttt. lQ. <q. 20gtJ1$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 11, 1973 
R,e: No. 71-229 - United States v. Dionisio 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
/ft· IS. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
~ 
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Ju.::;t ice Brerman 
Just~ ce White 
Jus"Clce Harshal l ' 
Juztice Bl~cb1 un 
Justice Powell / 
J us tice Rehnquist 
From: Stewart , J. 
Circulated: DEC 2 7 1972 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ~TfTE~ted: ___ _ 
Ko. 71- 229 
United States, Petitioner,)On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
A t 
. D. . . l Appeals for the Seventh 
l1 01110 10l11Sl0 et a. c· .t 
lrCUl . 
[January -, 1973] 
MR. JusrrcE S·rEWART delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
A special grand jury was convened in the Northern 
District of Illinois in February 1971, to investigate pos-
sible violations of federal criminal statutes relating to 
gambling. In the course of its investigation the grand 
jury received in evidence certain voice recordings that 
had been obtained pursuant to court orders.1 
The grand jury subpoenaed approximately 20 per-
sons, including the respondent Dionisio, seeking to obtain 
from them voice exemplars for comparison with the re-
1 The court orders were issued pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518, 
a statute authorizing the interception of wire communications upon 
a judicial determination that " (a) there is probable cause for 
belief that an individual is committing, has commit ted, or is about 
to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this 
chnpter [inrluding the transmis~ion of wagering information]; 
(b) there is probable cau~c for belief that particular communications 
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; 
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and ha\·e fnilcd 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to ~uccced if tried or to be 
too dangerous: (d) there is probable ca u~e for belief that the 
facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral com-
munications arc to be intercepted are bciug used, or arc nbout to 
be used, in connection with the commis~ion oF such offense, or are 
leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such per~on ." 
, '1.-
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corded conversaLions that had been received in evidence. 
Each ''"itness ''"as advised that he was a potential defend-
ant in a criminal prosecution. Each "·as asked to ex-
amine a tra11scnpt of a-;-;"' intercepted conversation, and 
to go to a nearby office of the United States Attorney to 
read the trans<'ript into a recording device. The wit-
llcsscs were advised that they would be allowed to have 
their attorneys present when they read the transcripts. 
Dionisio and other witnesses refused to furnish the voice 
exemplars, asserting that these disclosures '"ould violate 
tlwir rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 
The Government then filed separate petitions in the 
United States District Court to compel Dionisio and 
the other witnesses to furnish the voice exemplars to 
the grand jury. The petitions stated that the exemplars 
were "essential and necessary'' to the grand jury investi-
gation, and that they would "be used solely as a standard 
of comparison in order to determine whether or not the 
witness is the person whose voice was intercepted .... " 
Following a hearing. the district judge rejected the 
witnesses' constitutional arguments and ordered them to· 
comply with the grand jury's request. He reasoned that 
voice exemplars, like handwriting exemplars or fi~er­
prints, were not testimonial or commumcatiVcevidence, 
andthat consequently ilie-order to proclucc them would 
not compel any witness to testify against himself. The 
district judge also found that there would be no Fourth 
Amendment violation, because the grand jury subpoena 
did not itself violate the Fourth Amendment, and the 
order to produce the voice exemplars would involve no 
unreasonable search and seizure within the proscription 
of that Amendment: 
"The witnesses arc lawfully before the grand jury 
pursuant to subpoena. The Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure-
applies only where identifying physical character-
71-229-0PI?\ LON 
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is tics, such as fingeqwin ts, are obtained as a result 
of unla\\'ful detention of a suspect, or when an in-
trusion into the body, such as a blood test, is under-
taken without a "·arrant, absent an emergency 
situation. E. g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 
721. 724- 728 (1909); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966)." ~ 
When Dionisio persisted in his refusal to respond to the 
grand jury's directive, the District Court adjudged him 
in civil contempt and ordered him committed to custody 
until he obeyed the court order. or until the expiration of 
18 months." 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 
442 F. 2<.1 276. It --agreed '"ith the District Court in 
rejecting the Fifth Amendment claims. 1 but concluded 
that to compel the voice recordings "·ould violate the 
Fourth Amendment. In the Court's view, the grand 
jury was "seeking to obtain the voice exemplars of the '"it-
nesses by the use of its subpoena po,Ycrs because probable 
cause did not exist for their arrest or for some other, 
less unusual, method of compelling the production of the 
exemplars." Id., at 280. The Court found that the 
Fourth Amendment applied to grand jury process. and 
that "under the fourth amendment ]a\\' enforcement 
officials may not compel the production of physical evi-
clencr absent a showing of the reasonableness of the 
seizure. Davis v. Nlississippi, 394 U.S. 721 .... " Iuid. 
In Davis this Court held that it '"as error to admit 
thSJ2-e"'T'tt''ner's fingerpnnts into evidence at his trial f9r 
" Thr dc·ci,.,ion of i hr Di~t rirt Comt i" umrportrcl. 
:: Tlw lit'(• of t lw "PC('i:ll grand ,iur.1· w:t" lS month", but could br 
rxtrndt'd for ::m uclditional 1~ month". 1~ C. S. C'. § :1331. 
1 Thr Comt nl"o rrjrrtrcl thr argumrnt tlwt thr grnnd .im~· 
proerdurr l'iolatc•d the witnr~,r~' Sixth Amrndmrnt right to eotlll::<rl. 
It found t!H' contention parlieulad.1· without mrrit in Yic•11· ol' thr 
option :1fl'orded thr witnr~~r;,; to ha1·r thrir nttonw.'·" prr~c·nt whilr 
i hr)· mndr t hr Yoier rceording". 4-1-2 F. 2d 27G, 27~. 
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rape, because they had been obtained during a police 
detention following a la"·less wholesale roundup of the 
~1er and more than 20 other youths. Equating 
the procedures Iollowed 6y the grand jury in the present 
case to the fingerprint detentions in Davis, the Court 
of Appeals reasoned that " [ t] he dragnet effect here, 
where approximately 20 persons vvere subpoenaed for 
purposes of identification, has the same invidious effect 
on fourth amendment rights as the practice condemned 
in Davis." !d., at 281. 
In view of a clear conflict between this decision and 
one in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit," we 
granted the Government's petition for certiorari. 406· 
U. S. 956. 
I 
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the conten-
tion that the compelled production of the voice exem-
plars would violate the Fifth Amendment. It has long 
been held that the compelled display of identifiable phys-
ical characteristics infringes no uiterest protected by 
the privile e a ainst com )Ulsor self- imination. In 
Holt v. nited States, 218 U. S. 245, 252, Mr. Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, dismissed as an "extrava-
gant extension of the Fifth Amendment" the argument 
that it violated the privilege to require a defendant to 
put on a blouse for identification purposes. He ex-
plained that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a 
criminal court to be ~itness a ainst himself IS a prolTbi-
tion o t e usc of 12h~sical or moral compulsion to extort 
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body 
as evidence when it may be material." !d. , at 252- 253. 
" United States v. Doe (Schwartz ), 457 F. 2d 895 (aiftrming 
civil contempt judgment against grand jury witne::;s for refn~al to 
furni~h handwriting exemplar~ ). 
71-2:29-0PlNION 
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More recently, in Schmerber v. Cal-ifornia, 384 U. S. 
757, we relied on Holt~ an~1oted that 
"both federal and state courts have usually held 
that ·[the privilege] offers no protection against 
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting. photogra )h-· 
ini, or rneasuremen s, to wn e or spea or identifi-
catiOn, to appear tn court, to stand, to assume a 
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. 
The distinction which has emerged, often expressed 
l in different ways, is that the privilege is a b,2;r against compeJling 'communications' or 'testimon ,' but that compu s10n w 1c ma es a suspect or ac-
cused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does 
not violate it." I d., at 764 (footnote omitted). 
I 
The Court held that the extraction and chemical analysis 
of a blood sample involved no "shadow of testimonial 
compulsion upon or enforced communication by the· 
accused." I d., at 765. 
These cases led us to conclude in Gilbert v. California, 
388 U. S. 263, that handwriting exemplars were not )rO-
tected by the priv1l~e against compu sory self-incrimina-
tion. While " [ o] ne's voice and handwriting are, of 
course, means of communication," we held that a "mere 
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what 
is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying 
physical characteristic outside its protection." Id., at 
267. And similarly in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 
218, we found no error in compelling a defendant ace 
of bank robbery to u er m a me-up words that had 
allegedly been spoken by the robber. The accused there 
was "required to use his voice as an identifying physical 
characteristic, not to speak his guilt." I d., at 222-223. 
TV ade and Gilbert definitively refute any contention 
that the compelled production of the voice exemplars 
in this case would violate the Fifth Amendment. The 
71-229-0PT~ [()N 
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voice recordings were to be used solely to measure the 
physical properties of the \\"itnesses' voices, not for the 
testimonial or communicative content of "·hat was to 
be said." 
II 
The Comt of Appeals held that the Fourth Amend-
ment required a preffininary showing of reasonableness 
hefore a grand jury witness could be compelled to fur-
nish a voice exemplar, and that in this case the proposed 
"smzurcs" of the voice exemplars would be unreason-
able because of the large number of witnesses summoned 
by the grand jury and directed to produce such exemplars. 
We disagree. 
The Fourth Amenclmen t guarantees that all people 
shall be "secure in their persons. houses. 11apers, and 
"The Comt of Apprnl~ for thr Sr,·rnth Ciri'uit :t pprnr~ to ha,·r 
rr cnntrd ~omrwhat from it~ rlr:tr and rorrcrt holding in thr prr,;rnt 
i':\~C th:d t hr compPIIrd product ion of Yoirr rxrmpla n-; would not 
Yiolatr the pridrp;r n~ain~t rompul~or~- ~rlf-inrriminaiion. In 
subscqurntly 0xpl:lining that holding, ihr, Court qunlificd it: 
' ·:\"r,·erthrlcs~. th r witnr~~e~ ll"err potential clcfrndanh, and sincr 
the pmpo~c of till' Yoicr rxemplar~ was to idrntif~· thC' YOii'rs 
obt n in rei b~- FBI :tgrnt s pur~un nt to a romt-orclrrrcl wirrtap, the 
~elf-incriminator~· impart of the• cornprllrcl rxPmplnr~ wns rlrnr. 
Tim:- thC' compcllrcl rxrmplars wrrr nt odd~ with thr spirit of tllC' 
Fifth Amrndmrnt. Brr:1usc thr Fifth Amrndmrnt illuminnirs thr 
Fourth ( ~rr ... Bo.nl v. l'nitrd Statrs [116 U. R. 616 I ... ). i!lC' 
Fomth Amendmrnt Yiolation npprar~ morr rrndilY than whrrc im-
mtmit~· is granted , and in Dionisio imrnunit~· hnd not ~'rt bern 
gmntrd." Ji'raser \'. ["nited States. 4.12 F. 2d 6](), 619 n . .1. 
But Boyd dr:tlt with thr compul~or_,. production of pri1·:tte book~ 
:l nd rrcorcb , tr~timonial sourer;;. n circum~hmcr in which thr " Fourth 
:1nd Fifth Amrndmrnts nm almo~t into raeh othrr." 116 U. S., 
at 630. In 1 he prrsC'nt cn~r. h~- cont ra~t. 110 Fifth .\mrndmrnt 
intrrc~t~ nrr .iropnrdizrd. tltC'I'r i~ no hint of tr~timonial rompul~ion. 
Thr Comt of A]lpr:tl~' ~uh.,equrnt nttempt to rend tltr "spirit of 
1 hr Fifth Amrndmrnt" into the produrtion of Yo icc rxrmplnrs 
cannot stt1Ti1·r comparison with Wade, Gilbert , and Srhmerbcr. 
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rffects, against unrea10onable searches and seizures .... " 
Any Fourth Amendment violation in the present set-
ting must rest on a. la ,\'less governmental intrusion 
upon the Eacy of "persons" rather than on inter-
ference with "pt'O])erty rcnr:t't'Onsltips or private paperR." 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767; see United 
States v. Doe (Sch wa.rtz). 437 F. 2d 895. 897. In Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. the Court explained the protection 
afforded to "persons'' in terms of the statement in Katz v. 
Um'ted States, 389 U. S. 347, that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people , not places." id., at 331, and con-
cluded that "wlwrever an individual may harbor a. 
reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' ... he is en ti tlrcl to 
be freC' from unreasonable governmental intrnsion." 
Terry Y. Ohio, 392 U. S .. at 9. 
As the Court made clear in Schmerber, supra, the 
obta.init 0' of )h sica.l evidence fron1 a person involves 
a 120tcntial Four 1 men ment violation at t\YO different 
levels-the "scizm e" of the "person" nC'ccssary to bring 
him into contact with government agents. sec. Davis v. 
MississiJrpi, 304 U. S. 721. and the subsequent search for 
and seizure of the evidence. In Schmerber \Ye found 
the initial seizure of the accused justified as a la,\'ful 
arrest, and the subsequent seizure of the blood sample 
from his body reasonable in light of thC' exigent cir-
cumstances. And in Terry, we concluded that twi ther 
the initial seizure of the person. an investigatory "stop" 
by a policeman. nor the subsequent search. a pat clmm 
of his outer clothing for weapons. constituted a violation 
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The con-
stitutionality of the compulsory production of exemplars 
from a grand jury witness necessarily turns on the same 
dual inquiry- whether either the initial compulsion of 
the person to appear before the grand jury, or the sub-
sequent directive to make a voice recording is an un-
rC'asonable "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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It is clear that ~subpoena to appear before a grand 
jury is not a "seizure" in tfie ] ourth Amendment sense, 
even tha'frgh th~ummons may be inconvenient or 
burdensome. Last Term we again acknowledged what 
has long been recognized,' that " [ c] itizens generally 
ar~ not constitutionally immune from grand jury sub-
poenas .... " Bmnzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 682. 
\~ncluded that: 
"[a]lthough the powers of the grand jury are not 
unlimited and are subject to the supervision of 
a judge, the longstanding principle that 'the public 
... has a right to every man's evidence,' except for 
those persons protected by a constitutional, common-
law, or statutory privilege, United States v. Bryan, 
339 U. S., at 331; Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U. S. 421, 438 (1932); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence· 
§ 2192 (MeN a ugh ton rev. 1961), is particularly ap-
plicable to grand jury proceedings." !d., at 688. 
These are recent reaffirmations of the historically 
grounded obli ation of every person to appear and give 
his evidence before t e gran JUry. e personal sacri-
fice involved is a part of thenecessary contribution of 
the individual to the welfare of the public." Blair v. 
United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281. See also Garland v. 
Torre, 259 F. 2d 545, 549. And while the duty may 
be "onerous" at times, it is "necessary to the admin-
istration of justice." Blair v. United States, supra, at 
281.8 
7 Sec generall~· Kastigar v. United Statl's, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444; 
Blai1· v. Uuitl'd Stat!'s, 250 U. S. 273, 279-281; 8 J. Wigmore, 
Evidrnce § 2191 (.J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
• The obligation to appear i~ no different for a per;;on who may 
himself be the ~ubject of the grand jury inquir~· . Scr l.i nill'd States 
Y. Doe (Schwartz ), 457 F. 2d 895, 898; United States v. Winter,. 
348 F. 2d 204, 207-208. 
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The compulsion exerted by a grand jury subpoena 
differs from the seizure eRected by an arrest ot even 
an investigative "stop" 111 more than civic obligation. 
For. as Judge ]'nenCITy wrote for the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit: 
"The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the 
threat of it and often in demeaning circumstances, 
and, in the case of arrest, results in a record in-
volvillg social stigma. A subpoena is served in 
the same manner as other legal process; it involves 
no stigma whatever; if the time for appearance is in-
convenient. this can generally be altered; a,ncl it re-
mains at all times under the control and supervision 
of a court." United States v. Doe (Schwartz) 457 
F. 2d 895, 898. 
Thus the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
correctly recognized in a case subsequent to the one 
now before us, that "a grand jury subpoena to testify is 
not that kind of governmental intrusion on privacy 
against which the Fourth Amendment affords protection, 
once the Fifth Amendment is satisfied." Fraser v. 
United States, 452 F. 2d 616, 620; cf. United States v. 
Weinberg, 439 F. 2d 743, 748-749. 
This case is thus quite different from Davis v. Missis-
siJa1i-supra, on which the Court of Appeals primarily 
relied. For in Davis it was the initial seizure-the law-
less dragnet detention-that violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments-not the taking of the finger-
prints. We noted that " [ i] nvestigatory seizures would 
subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the 
harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary deten-
tion," 394 U. S., at 726, and we left open the question 
"·hether, consistently with the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, narrowly circumscribed procedures might 
be developed for obtaining fingerprints from people when 
r r 
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there was no probable cause to arrest them. Id., at 
728.n Davis is plainly inapposite to a case where the 
initial restraint docs not itself infringe the Fourth 
Amendment. 
\ 
This is not to say that a grand jury subpoena is some 
talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections. 
The grand jury cannot require a witness to testify 
agai11st himself. It cannot require the production by a 
person of private books and records that would incrimi-
nate him. See Boyd v. United Slates, 116 U. S. 616, 
633-635.'" The Fourth Amendment provides protection 
against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sv.;eeping 
in its terms "to be regarded as reasonable." Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U. fl. 43, 76; cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing 
Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 208, 217. And last Term, 
in the context of a First Amendment claim, '"e indi-
cated that the Constitution could not tolerate the trans-
formation of the grand jury into an instrument of op-
pression: "Official harassment of the press undertaken 
not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a 
reporter's relationship \Yith his news sources would have 
110 justification. Grand juries arc subject to judicial 
control and subpoenas to motions to quash. \Vc do not 
expect courts \\'ill forget that grand juries must operate 
within the limits of the First Amcndmen t as well as 
0 .Tuclgr \Yrinfrld eorrrrtly dJ<ll'aC'trrizrcl Davis :IH "but anothrt" 
applieation of the prineiplr that thr Fourth Amrndmrnt :tpplir~ 
to :tll ~rarchr8 and ~oizurr~ of the prr~on, no malt('t' what thr ;;;cope 
or clmation. It hrld that in thr cin·um~tanrr~ thrrr Jll'r~rntrd the 
([rt ent ion for the sole pnrpo~r of fi ng;crprint ing; was in viol:\! ion of 
the Fourth Amendmrnt ban again~t unrra~onahlr ~rarC'h and ~rizmr." 
Tlwm , .. New York Stork E.cchanoe. 80(i F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (foot-
notr omitted). Scr al~o Allen ,., Cupp, 420 F. '2d 756, 760. 
' 0 Vi'hilc Boyd wa~ concernrcl with n motion to procluer im·oirr~ 
nt a forfriturr trial , thr Conrt trratrcl it a~ the rqui,·alrnt of a 
~ubporna du('es tc('/l/11, ancll/ale , .. Henl.·e/, 201 u.S . .J-3, 7G, applied 
Bo!Jd in the contrxl of a grand jury ~ubpocna. 
' ~· 
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the Fifth." Rmnzburg v. H rryes, 408 U. S. G65, 707- 708. 
See also, id., at 710 (Po\VJGU, J., concurring). 
But we arc here faced with no such constitutional 
infirmities in the subpoena to appear before the grand 
jury or in the order to make the voice recordings. There 
is, as we have said, no valid Fifth Amendment claim. 
\ 
There was no order to produce private books and papers, 
and no sweeping subpoena duces tecum. And even if 
Branzburg be extended beyond its First Amendment 
moorings and tied to a more generalized due process con-
cept, there is still no indication in this case of the kind 
of harassment that was of concern there. 
The Court of Appeals found critical significance in the 
fact that the grancl jury had summoned approximately 
20 witnesses to furnish voice exemplars." We think that 
fact is basically irreleYant to the constitutional issues 
here. The grand jury may have been attempting to 
identify a number of voices on the tapes in evidrnce, or 
it might have summoned the 20 \Yitnesses in an effort to 
identify one voice. But whatever the case, "[a l grand 
jury's investigation is not fully carried out until every 
available clue has been run clown and all \Yitncsses ex-
amined in every proper "·ay to find if a crime has been 
committed .... " Un·ited States v. Stone, 429 F. 2d 138r 
140. See also Wood v. Georgia. 370 U. S. 375, 392. As 
the Court recalled last Term, "Because its task is to 
inquire into the existence of possible criminal conduct 
and to return only well-founded indictments, its investi-
gative po,vcrs are necese:arily broad." Rmnzburg v. 
'
1 As noted abon•. ante, p. -, there .i~ no ,·;did eompari~on 
brt \\'C'f'll the dcntention~ of thr 2+ ~·o11th~ in Da1•is, nnd thr grand 
,im~· subporn.1s to t hr willlr~~r·~ here. \Vhilr I hr clragnrt drtrn-
tion~ b,,. the ]Jolirc did constitute sub~tanti:tl intrusion~ into thC' 
Fomth and FourtC'enth Amf'ndmcnt right~ of carh of the ~·ouths 
in Davis, no person has a justifiable c~qwctation of imn1unit1· from 
a grand jury ~ubpoC'na. 
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Hayes, 408 U. S., at 688. 12 The grand jury may well 
find it desirable to call numerous wituesses in the course 
of an investigation. It does not follow that each wit-
ness may resist a subpoena on the ground that too many 
witnesses have been called. Neither the order to Dionisio 
to appear, nor the order to make a voice recording was 
rendered unreasonable by the fact that many others 
were subjected to the same compulsion. 
But the conclusion that Dionisio's compulsory appear-
ance before the grand jury was not an unreasonable 
"seizure" is the answer to only the first part of the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry here. Dionisio argues that the 
grand jury's subsequent directive to make the voice 
recording was itself an infringement of his rights 
under the Fourth Amendment. We cannot accept that 
argument. 
In Katz v. United States, supra, we said that the 
Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what "a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home 
or office .... " 389 U. S. 347, 351. The physical char-
acteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as 
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are 
constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial 
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly 
produced for others to hear. No person can have a rea-
sonable expectation that others will not know the sound 
of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect 
12 "[The grand .i my] i~ a grand inquest, a body with powers 
of investigation and inquisition, the scope of who~e inquiries i~ not 
to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecn~ts of 
the probable re~:~ult of the inve~tigation, or by doubts whether any 
particular individual will be found properly ~ubject to an accusa-
tion of crime. A~ has been said before, the identity of the offender, 
and the preci:::e nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are 
developed at the conclusion of the grand jury'~:~ labor8, not aL the 
beginning. Ile11dricks v. United States, 22:3 U.S. 178, 18-±." Blair v. 
·cnited States, 250 U.S. 273, 282. 
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that his face will be a mystery to the world. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated: 
"Except for the rare recluse who chooses to live his 
life in complete solitude, in our daily lives we con-
stantly speak and write, and while the content of 
a communication is entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection, ... the underlying identifying charac-
teristics-the constant factor throughout both public 
and private communications-are open for all to 
see or hear. There is no basis for constructing a 
wall of privacy against the grand jury which does 
not exist in casual contacts with strangers. Hence, 
no intrusion into an individual's privacy results from 
compelled execution of handwriting or voice exem-
plars; nothing is being exposed to the grand jury 
that has not previously been exposed to the public 
at large." United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 
F. 2d 895. 898-899. 
The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus 
immeasurably further removed from the Fourth Amend-
ment protection than was the intrusion into the body 
effected by the blood extraction in Schrnerber. "The 
interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth 
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the 
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained." 
Schrnerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 769-770. Sim-
ilarly, a seizure of voice exemplars does not involve the 
"severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal 
security," effected by the "patdown" in Terry-"surely 
... an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humilating 
experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 24-25. Rather, 
this is like the fingerprinting in Davis, where, though the 
initial dragnet detentions were constitutionally imper-
missible, we noted that the fingerprinting itself, "involves 
none of the probing into an individual's private life and 
thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." Davis 
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v. Mississippi, 304 U.S. 721, 727; cf. Thom v. Kew York 
Stock E:rchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1000. 
Since neither the summons to appear before the grand 
jury, nor its directive to make a voice recording infringed 
upon any interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, there was no justification for requiring the grand 
jury to satisfy even the minimal requirement of "rea-
sonableness" imposed by tbC' Court of Appeals.'" Sec 
United Slates v. Doe (Schwartz). 457 F. 2d 895, 809-900. 
A grand jury has broad invC'stigativc pmvers to deter-
mine whether a crimC' has been committed and who has 
committed it. The jurors may act on tips, rumors, 
evidence offered by the prosecutor. or their own personal 
knowledge. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665. 701. No 
grand jury witness is "entitled to set limits to the inves-
tigation that the grand jury may conduct." Blair v. 
United Stales, 250 U. S. 273. 282. And a sufficient basis 
for an indictment may only emerge at the end of the 
investigation when all the evidence has been received. 
"It is impossible to conceive that . . . the 
examination of witnesses must be stopped until a 
basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred, 
"·hen the very object of the examination is to ascer-
tain who shall be indicted." Hale v. Henkel, 201 
U. S. 43, 65. 
Since Dionisio raised no valid Fourth Amendment 
claim. there is no more reason to require a preliminary 
showing of reasonableness here than there would be 
in the case of any witness "·ho. despite the lack of any 
constitutional or statutory privilege, declined to ans",:er 
a question or comply with a grand jury request. Neither 
the Constitution nor our prior cases justify any such 
interference with grand jury proceedings. 
' " ln !laic v. Ilrnl.-rl, 201 0. S. 43 , 77, the Court found that such 
a ::;tandard had not been met, but a~ noted ahol't', ante, p. -, 
that was a ca~e where the Fourth Amendment lwd been infringed 
b~· an overly broad subpoena to produce book:; and paper:;. 
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The Ji'ifth Amendment guarantees that no civilian 
may be brought to trial for an infamous crime "unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." This 
constitutional guarantee presupposes an investigative 
body "acting independently of either prosecuting attor-
ney or judge," Stirone v. United Stales, 361 U. S. 212. 
218, whose mission is to clear the innocent, no less than 
to bring to trial those who may be guilty.'' Any holding 
that would saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and we-
limmary s wwmgs would assuredly im.pede its investi-
gation and frustrate the public's interest in the 
fai;- and expeditious admimstratwn of the criminal laws. 
Cf. United States v. Ryan, 4o2 U. S. 530. 532-533; 
Costello v. Um'ted Stales, 350 U. S. 359. 363-364; Cob-
bledick v. United Stateil, 309 U. S. 323. 327-328.'" The 
historic conrrpt of the grand jury as a protective bulwark 
standing solidly between the ordinary citizrn and an 
""IT] he in~titution wn,; :1doptrd in thi" count r~·. and i~ rontinurd 
l'rom ron~i(krntion,; ~imilar to tho,;r whirh p:iw to it it~ rhiel' Ya!uc 
in Enp:l:11ld, and i" dr,;ip:nr.d as a mran~. not on!~· ol' hrinp:in:.r to trial 
prr,;on,; arcu,;rd of public offrrH•rs upon just p:ronncb, bul nl"o a;; 
:1 mrans of protecting t hr cit ir.rn aga in~t unfoundrd arcn,;nt ion, 
whrt her it eomr:; from gon·rnmrnt. or br prompted b~· p:lrti,;an 
pa;;,;ion or prin1tc enmit~· . No person shall hr rr<]nirrd, accord-
ing to thr fnndamrntal law of thr conntr~·, excrpt in the ra~rs 
mrntioncd, to :ln~\1'<'1' for nn~· of thr higher crimrH unle~~ thiH body, 
conHi~t ing of not lc~~ than sixt('rn nor .more than twrnty-thrrr good 
and llnl"ful mrn. srlcrtcd from thr body of thr diHtrirt, shall clednrr, 
upon rarrful delibrration, under the solemnity ol' an oath, thul 
thrre is good re:J,on for his arru~nt ion and trial." Ex parte Bain, 
121 U. S. 1, 11 ((]uotinp: grand .iur~· charge of .Tm;tire Firld). 8rr 
al,;o Wood "· Gcoraia. 370 P. R. :37!), 390. 
'" Thr. po~,;ibililie;: for clrla~· enu~NI b~· rrquiring initial :<howings 
of '' rra~onnblcnr~~" nrc illustrnt rd b~ · thr Court of A PJirnls' ~u b~r­
quent dPri~ion in In 1·r. September JlJ/'1 Grand Juru. 45+ F. 2d 5RO, 
rr1·'d sub nom, United States v. Jl!a.ra. post. p. -, when• the 
C'omt hrld that t hr G01·rrnmrnt wns rrquirrd to Hhow in 1111 
ncii 'Pl'~:tr~· hearing thnt it,; rC(]liPHt for exc•mpLtr" was rc·n~on:1blr, 
nnd "reasonahlenr~s" included proof thnt the rxrmplan; rould 110t 
be obtnined from other sourres. 
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overzealous prosecutor may no longer be wholly realistic, 
but if the grand jury is even to approach the proper per-
formance of its constitutional mission, it must be free 
to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influ-
ence or supervision, so long as it does not trench upon 
the legitimate rights of any witness called before it. 
Since the Court of Appeals found an unreasonable 
search and seizure where none existed, and imposed a 
preliminary showing of reasonableness where none was 
required, its judgment is reversed and this case is re-
manded to that Court for furth; proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
